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Abstract 
This paper introduces model uncertainty into a behavioral New Keynesian 
DSGE framework and derives robust optimal monetary policies. We build 
a heterogeneous agents DSGE model, where a fraction of agents behave 
according to some forms of bounded rationality (boundedly rational 
agents), while the reminder operate on the basis of expectations that are 
corrected on average (rational agents). We consider two potential 
mechanisms of expectations formation to generate beliefs. The central 
bank observes the aggregate economic dynamics, but it ignores the 
fraction of boundedly rational agents and/or the mechanism they use to 
form their expectations. Non-Bayesian robust control techniques are then 
adopted to minimize a welfare loss derived from the second-order 
approximation of agents’ utilities. We account of model uncertainty 
considering both commitment and discretion regime. 
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1 Introduction 
The DSGE approach represents dominant framework used for quantitative policy 
analysis, especially for monetary and fiscal policies. There, expectations on 
macro-variable dynamics are crucial for understanding the policy transmission 
mechanism and to design optimal policies. However, policymakers might feature 
uncertainty about how expectations are formed, and therefore, on the way those 
affect the policy transmission and welfare. Our paper aims to investigate the 
optimal monetary policy design in such a situation by using non-Bayesian robust 
control techniques. In the spirit of McCallum (1988) and Taylor (1993), 
monetary policies derive here provide a performance that is robust to various 
forms of model misspecification.  
Along the lines of a recent strand of literature,1we assume that all the agents are 
forward looking, but they might differ in the way they form their expectations: a 
fraction of them behave according to some forms of bounded rationality 
(boundedly rational agents), whereas the reminder operate on the basis of 
expectations corrected on average (rational agents). We also assume that 
monetary authorities ignore the share of boundedly rational agents and/or the 
way they form their expectations. Robust control techniques are then introduced 
to manage the central bank’s model uncertainty and to derive optimal robust 
policies, as the cost of misinterpreting the economy can be large (i.e., optimal 
policy rules designed in a situation may lead to large welfare loss in others).2  
The existence of heterogeneous expectations is well documented. For instance, 
Carroll (2003) showed that information slowly diffuses among agents. Mankiw et 
al. (2004) and Branch (2004) obtained evidence on time-varying dispersion of 
beliefs. Evans and Ramey (1992, 1998) and Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998, 
2000) found evidence that if information has a cost, it can be optimal for agents 
to behave by choosing the non-rational expectations operator. Evidence is also 
provided by laboratory experiments (e.g., Assenza et al. 2011). 
In our theoretical macro model, we consider two popular forms of expectation 
formation processes, which have been recently developed within New Keynesian 
DSGE models. Both approaches assume some forms of adaptive expectations for 
a fraction of agents, but they differ in the agents’ relevant forecasting horizon.  
Agents might take their decisions either considering long- or short-term 
expectations. The former, e.g., is the case of consumption decisions based on 
the expected permanent income, while the latter is the case of consumption 
decisions based on the Euler equation. It is worth mentioning that when all the 
agents are rational, forecasting horizons do not matter, i.e., decisions based on 
long forecasts are consistent to decisions based on short-horizon expectations. 
                                           
1 In the last years, macroeconomic models have incorporated many different behavioral elements 
demonstrating that heterogeneity of agents is key factor in the analysis of the effects of economic 
policies. The issue of heterogeneity in the agents’ expectation formation process is emphasized in 
the surveys provided by Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) and Branch and McGough (2016). 
Alternative approaches use learning (Evans and Honkapohja (2001, 2003)), rule-of-thumb agents 
(e.g., Galí and Gertler, 1999; Galí et al. 2004); near-rationality (e.g., Roberts, 1997; Akerlof et 
al., 2000). See also Kurz et al. (2002, 2005), De Grauwe (2011), De Grauwe and Kaltwasser 
(2012), and Gaffeo et al. (2013). 
2 Formally, robust policy control techniques design policy for the worst possible outcome within a 
pre-specified set of plausible models over which the policymaker is unable to formulate a 
probability distribution (Hansen and Sargent, 2004). 
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By contrast, forecasting horizons makes the difference when bounded rationality 
is introduced. If some agents form their beliefs by using a behavioral 
mechanism, agents who base their decisions on (miss-specified) long-term 
expectations behave differently from those who base their choices on (equally 
miss-specified) short-term expectations. We refer to the former case as that of 
agents who are long-horizon forecasters (LHFs) and to the latter as the case of 
agents who are short-sighted forecasters (SSFs). 
The SSFs have been first proposed by Branch and McGough (2009) in DSGE 
models. They provide a micro-founded sticky-price model in which agents have 
boundedly rational expectations and derive aggregate macro-dynamics. Branch 
and McGough (2009) suppose that households behave according to their Euler 
equation and, similarly, producers operate looking at one-period-ahead 
expectations. They impose some restrictive assumptions on belief formation 
which are sufficient to obtain aggregate demand and supply relations of the 
same form embedded in the traditional New Keynesian framework where only 
the specification of one-period ahead forecasts is different.  
Similarly, Massaro (2013) assumes that some agents have cognitive limitations 
and use heuristics to forecast macro variables. But, as in Preston (2006), agents’ 
decision rules now depend on long-horizon forecasts. Individual decision rules 
solve infinite-horizon-decision problems. In making current choices about 
spending and pricing, agents consider forecasts of macroeconomic conditions 
over an infinite horizon. As agents do not have a complete economic model of 
determination of aggregate variables, the predicted aggregate dynamics depend 
on long-horizon forecasts. By explicitly aggregating LHFs’ individual decision 
rules, Massaro derives aggregate demand and supply equations consistent with 
heterogeneous expectations and LHFs. 
Summing up, SSFs with cognitive limitations make mistakes when attempt to 
forecast variables one-period ahead, which are those relevant for taking their 
choices. By contrast, LHFs with cognitive limitations make mistakes in 
forecasting long-run macroeconomic variables. Both update their beliefs as new 
information becomes available, but the associated micro-founded aggregate 
dynamics are different. In both frameworks, it is possible to derive a welfare 
measure based on a second-order approximation of the agents’ utility function. 
The welfare criterion will be different, even if the utility is the same because it 
depends on the consumption and price dispersions, which evolve differently 
when either SSFs or LHFs are considered and cognitive limitations are assumed. 
In our analysis, we proceed in three steps. First, we focus upon the risk of 
ignoring the distribution of agents between rational and boundedly rational 
forecasters. In this case, the central bank ignores the share of rational agents in 
the economy but knows if they are SSFs or LHFs. Second, we investigate the 
consequences of a central bank that ignores the correct shape of welfare loss 
equation. In this case, the central banker can make two kinds of mistakes: 
assuming long-term expectations in a world where all the agents are SSFs; or 
neglecting infinite horizon forecasts in a context where agents are LHFs. Finally, 
we introduce a bi-dimensional model uncertainty, assuming that the central 
banker ignores both the share and the forecasting mechanism of boundedly 
rational agents. 
Our main findings are that: i) minimax regret and minimax criteria can lead to 
misleading alternative policy implications; ii) implementing the wrong rule 
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always entails costs in terms of welfare losses, whatever the right model is; iii) 
optimal delegation can occur under discretion, i.e. the government delegates to 
the central bank an objective function that differs from the social welfare 
function to improve the society welfare gain; iv) ignoring that expectations are 
formed over infinite horizon is less costly in terms of additional welfare losses 
compared to the case where short-term expectations are ignored; v) under bi-
dimensional uncertainty it is not always true that central banker’s double 
misunderstandings are costlier than single unidimensional uncertainties. 
Closely related to our results are the researches by Gasteiger (2014, 2017), Di 
Bartolomeo et al. (2016), and Beqiraj et al. (2017). Considering either LHFs or 
SSFs, these studies have emphasized how prescriptions for optimal monetary 
policy are sensitive to the assumptions on how agents’ form their beliefs. In the 
Branch and McGough‘s framework (2009), Gasteiger (2014) uses an ad hoc 
quadratic welfare function to study optimal policy and its implementation by an 
interest rate rule.3 By a second-order approximation of the policy objective from 
the consumers’ utility, Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) and Beqiraj et al. (2017) 
derive welfare criteria consistent with, respectively, SSFs and LHFs when some 
agents have cognitive limitations. Then they use the welfare measure to 
investigate the optimal policy design. 
The rest paper is organized as follows. Robust control techniques are introduced 
in Section 2. The general framework consistent with heterogeneous expectations 
of different kind is briefly illustrated in Section 3. Model uncertainty and robust 
optimal policies are applied to the model in Section 4, which illustrates our 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2 Methodology 
Robustness analysis is introduced to evaluate policies in the presence of model 
uncertainty. It has been developed, among others, by Levin and Williams 
(2003), Brock and Durlauf (2005), and Brock et al. (2003, 2007). 
The basic ideas beyond model uncertainty is that a policymaker wishes to 
choose a policy rule 𝑝 among a set 𝑃 to minimize a loss function 𝑙(𝛩), where 𝛩 is 
a vector of outcomes, which indicates key aspects of the economy that matter to 
policymaker. The elements described by 𝛩  can be defined by a conditional 
probability: 
 𝜇 = (𝛩|𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑚) (1) 
which indicates that the state of the economy depends on the policy choice(𝑝), 
the available data( 𝑑 ), and the true model of the economy ( 𝑚 ). Then, a 
policymaker wishes to minimize (𝛩) by choosing a policy to affect (1).However, 
the policy maker does not know the true model of the economy among several 
alternatives. Alternative models call for different policy prescriptions. 
Different approaches have been proposed to solve the problem, including 
Bayesian, minimax regret, and minimax (see Brock et al., 2003; and Kuester 
and Wieland, 2010, for detailed discussions). To derive robust optimal policy, we 
                                           
3 Both Branch and McGough (2009) and Massaro (2013) assumed that the central bank sets the 
interest rate according to a simple Taylor-kind rule and analyze the dynamical consequences of 
canonical policy rules in case of heterogeneity of beliefs. 
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focus on non-Bayesian techniques. Specifically, we rely on minimax regret and 
minimax. 
The minimax regret criterion, developed by Savage (1951), concerns avoiding 
regrets that may result from making a non-optimal decision. The regret is the 
difference of the loss incurred by implementing certain policy in a certain given 
specification and the loss obtained by using the optimal policy in that given 
specification. Savage’s minimax regret criterion implies that optimal robust 
policy is the policy associate to the lowest regret. The use of Savage’s minimax 
regret in economics is extensively discussed, among others, by Brock et al. 
(2007). 
Formally, given a given policy 𝑝 and a model 𝑚, the regret 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑚) related to 
the policy choice can be defined according to: 
 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑚) =  𝐸(𝑙(Θ)|𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑚) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝∈𝑃𝐸(𝑙(Θ)|𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑚) (2) 
According to Savage (1951), the minimax regret policy is defined by: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝∈𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚∈𝑀R(𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑚) (3) 
The minimax regret criterion considers that certain realizations of the unknown 
state of nature (our correct model) are associated with relatively high losses 
regardless of the policy choice. To grasp the intuition of the criterion, suppose 
that there are two policies (a and b) and two possible models (A and B). For 
policy a, there are a loss under model A of 11 and a loss under model B of 10. 
For policy b, the losses under model A and B are 15 and 5, respectively. The 
minimax regret policy implies that policy b is chosen, since the maximum regret 
for policy a is 10-5=5 whereas it equals 15-11=4 for policy b. 
Among non-Bayesian techniques, alternative to the minimax regret criteria is the 
minimax criteria, which is the basis of the literature on robustness analysis. It 
has been applied to macroeconomics by Hansen and Sargent (2003). Proposed 
by Wald (1950), the minimax approach requires that a policy is chosen to 
minimize the expected loss under the least favorable model in the model set. 
The minimax policy choice can be written as: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝∈𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚∈𝑀𝐸(𝑙(𝛩)|𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑀) (4) 
In our previous example, the minimax criterion implies that policy a is chosen 
(instead of policy b). When policy a is considered, the maximum loss is 11, 
whereas it is 15 when policy b is assumed. The reason explaining the fact that 
the two minimax criteria lead to different policy choices is that under model a, 
both policies lead to similar losses, while these are quite different in case of 
model b. The minimax criterion has been in fact criticized because it assumes 
the worst scenario possible on assessing polices. 
After introducing our economic framework in next session, we assume model 
uncertainty and consider the cost of different “misunderstandings” by the central 
bankers. We analyze the case where the central bank ignores: 
1. the distribution of agents between rational forecasters and boundedly 
rational ones (Section 4.2); 
2. how the known fraction of boundedly rational agents form their 
expectations (Section 4.3);  
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3. both the distribution of agents and the mechanism used by boundedly 
rational agents to form their beliefs (Section 4.4).  
To conduct our robustness analysis on comparable models and isolate the costs 
related to the share, type or both of bounded rationality, the Branch and 
McGough (2009) expectation framework has been derived in the context of a 
model with decentralized markets.   
We compute the welfare for all central bank possible beliefs given the true model 
of the economy, showing how central bankers’ misunderstandings are always 
costly. Conducting a stabilization policy under wrong beliefs entails welfare 
worsening due to an inefficient management of agents’ expectations. Finally, by 
using Savage’s minimax regret criterion and minimax, we look at robust optimal 
policies.  
3 A behavioral macro model with heterogeneous agents4 
The economy is populated by heterogeneous agents, who may differ in the way 
they form their expectations. The predicted aggregate dynamics depend on the 
assumption about horizon forecasts. Specifically, first-order conditions and 
budget constraints can be represented by linking current and one-period ahead 
(expected) variables or, using forward iterations, by relating current and any–
period ahead (expected) variables. When expectations are rational, these 
representations are equivalent. But, when the micro-foundations underpinning 
the New Keynesian model are solved relaxing the rational expectations 
assumption, the expectations horizon matters since the representations are no 
longer the same (Preston, 2006). Along these insights, we derive parsimonious 
micro-founded representations of DSGE sticky–price models that are consistent 
with boundedly rational individuals, we consider two polar cases.  
The economy is populated by a continuum of households represented by an 
interval [0,1] . Each household consists of a continuum of agents which are 
employed across firms and share dividends within the household. Households 
maximize the same utility function, but may form their expectations according to 
different processes, expectation operators (ℰ) are thus indexed by 𝑖. Agents of 
kind 𝑖  choose their consumption, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , and labor supply, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 , to maximize the 
expected present discounted value of their utility, i.e.,  
 ℰ𝑖,0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
(
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
− 𝜐
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
)      (5) 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1)  is the discount factor; 𝜎  is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion;𝛾 is the inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity; 𝜐is the labor disutility 
scaling parameter; 𝐶𝑡
𝑖 ≡ (∫ 𝐶𝑡
𝑖1
0
(𝑗)
𝜂−1
𝜂 𝑑𝑗)
𝜂
𝜂−1
 is the composite consumption good, 
                                           
4 This section is drawn upon Beqiraj et al. (2017). It only sketches the model. The behavioral 
assumptions and micro-foundations are largely discussed by Branch and McGough (2009) and 
Massaro (2013), who derived the original New Keynesian behavioral models used here. In Branch 
and McGough (2009) a yeoman farmer’s model is assumed, while in Massaro (2013) production 
and consumption decisions are decentralized. For the sake of comparison, we always adopt the 
latter assumption. 
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where 𝐶𝑡
𝑖(𝑗)  is the quantity of good 𝑗 ∈ [0,1]  consumed by the household 𝑖  in 
period 𝑡. The consistent aggregate price index for consumption is defined by 
𝑃𝑡 ≡ [∫ 𝑃𝑡
1
0
(𝑗)1−𝜂𝑑𝑗]
1
1−𝜂
 with 𝜂 denoting the elasticity of substitution among goods.  
Similarly, we assume that the supply side of the economy is characterized by a 
continuum of firms of each production type 𝑗 , operating under monopolistic 
competition. Firms maximize profits but may use different processes to form 
their expectations. If prices are sticky, heterogeneity in expectations matters. 
We assume a Calvo (1983) price setting framework: firms can reset prices with 
probability (1 − 𝜉𝑝) ∈ (0,1) each time 𝑡.  
Assuming SSFs, the aggregation of the log-linearized consumers’ Euler equations 
and the firms’ pricing rules yields to the dynamic IS and Phillips curve:  
 𝑦𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
[𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1)] 𝑑𝑖 (6) 
 𝜋𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
(𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡)𝑑𝑖 (7) 
where 𝜅 = (1 − 𝜉𝑝)(1 − 𝛽𝜉𝑝)/𝜉𝑝 > 0. 
By contrast, assuming LHFs, first-order conditions are combined with budget 
constraints and iterated forward, we then achieve the following expressions for 
the dynamic IS and Phillips curve: 
 𝑦𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
∑ 𝛽𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
((1 − 𝛽)𝑦𝑖,𝑠 −
𝛽
𝜎
(𝑟𝑖,𝑠 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑠+1)) 𝑑𝑖 (8) 
 𝜋𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
∑(𝜉𝑝𝛽)
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
((1 − 𝜉𝑝)𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑠+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑠) 𝑑𝑖 (9) 
Either in the case ofSSFs or LHFs, the log-deviation of the marginal cost from its 
steady state can be written as 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = (𝜎 + 𝛾)𝑦𝑡 .It is also easy to verify that 
assuming homogeneous rational agents, both (6) and (8) collapse to the same 
expression, which is the usual well-known IS curve. Similarly, (7) and (9) 
converge to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.  
Henceforth, we assume that the economy is populated by two types of agents, 
who differ in their expectations formation process. A fraction 𝛼  have rational 
expectations (rational agents), while the remaining 1 − 𝛼  (boundedly rational 
agents) form expectations according to a mechanism of bounded rationality.5 
Each rational agent 𝑖  forecasts macroeconomic variables according to the 
following rule 
 ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℛ 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡+1 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 (10) 
                                           
5 For the sake of brevity, 𝛼 is fixed. See Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) for a discussion. 
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where ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℛ  is the expectation operator used by the rational agent 𝑖 to forecast 
𝑥𝑡+1  at 𝑡  and 𝜁𝑖,𝑡  is an i.i.d. expectation error with zero mean defined in the 
support identified by the agents considered (i.e., in the case of rational agents: 
(0, 𝛼)). Aggregation among rational agents then yields 
 ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℛ
𝛼
0
𝑥𝑡+1𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 (11) 
The remaining 1 − 𝛼  agents have cognitive limitations and use heuristics to 
forecast macro variables. As previously illustrated, the predicted aggregate 
dynamics depend on the assumption about horizon forecasts. SSFs form their 
expectations focusing on one-period ahead forecasts based on heuristics and 
making mistakes in predicting the next period values for relevant aggregate 
macroeconomic variables. LHFs, instead, use heuristics to forecast 
macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon and make errors in those 
predictions. 
Looking at the fraction 1 − 𝛼, we begin by assuming that agents are SSFs. They 
set their behavior at time 𝑡 based on their expectations on consumption (output) 
or price at price 𝑡 + 1. Households satisfy an Euler equation, while firms set their 
price according to a Calvo’s pricing rule. However, differently from the traditional 
case, SSFs’ expectations are based on some heuristics and affected by 
systematic errors. Boundedly rational agents form their beliefs based on a 
simple perceived linear law of motion, i.e., 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡−1. Therefore, 
 ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℬ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 (12) 
where ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℬ  is the expectation operator used by boundedly rational agents. 
Applying the law of iterated expectations, we obtain ℰ𝑡
ℬ𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡+1, 
then aggregating 
 ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℬ
1
𝛼
𝑥𝑡+1𝑑𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑥𝑡−1 (13) 
By imposing some minimal restrictions to the heuristics used by the SSFs, 
Branch and McGough (2009) show that (12) implies a micro-founded 
representation of the sticky price New Keynesian model very similar to the 
traditional case. The generalization of the New Keynesian sticky price model to 
heterogeneous expectations, in fact, implies that the conditional expected values 
of the textbook model are replaced by a convex combination of expectations 
operators (rational (11) and heuristics (13)).  
Formally, the aggregate IS demand curve and the Phillips Curve become: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑦𝑡−1 −
𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝑡−1
𝜎
 (14) 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽[𝛼𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝑡−1] + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑡 (15) 
Now, let us look at the case of LHFs, they use heuristics to forecast 
macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon. The selection of heuristics 
takes place at the beginning of period 𝑡, when they observe and compare past 
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performances. Each predictor 𝜃𝑖 ∈ Θ, ∀𝑖 ∈ [0,1], is evaluated according to the past 
squared forecast error (performance measure). The distribution of beliefs then 
evolves over time as a function of past performances according to the 
continuous choice model (Diks and van der Weide, 2005). The distribution of 
beliefs is normal, and its evolution is characterized by a mean equal to 𝑥𝑡−1 and 
a finite variance that is decreasing in the agents’ sensitivity to differences in 
performances.  
Aggregating among boundedly rational agents, we obtain 
 ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
𝛼
𝑥𝑡+1𝑑𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) ∫ 𝜃𝑖
Θ
𝑑𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝑥𝑡−1 (16) 
By using (16) into (8) and (9), we get the representation of the IS curve and 
Phillips cure, which are respectively 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
[(1 − 𝛽)𝑦𝑠 −
𝛽
𝜎
(𝑟𝑠 − 𝜋𝑠+1)] + 
 +(1 − 𝛼) [𝑦𝑡−1 −
𝛽
𝜎
(1 − 𝛽)𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝛽𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝜋𝑡−1
1 − 𝛽
] (17) 
and 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡 ∑(𝜉𝑝𝛽)
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
[(1 − 𝜉𝑝)𝛽𝜋𝑠+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑠] + 
 +(1 − 𝛼) [
𝜃𝑘
1 − 𝜉𝑝𝛽
𝑚𝑐𝑡−1 +
𝜃(1 − 𝜉𝑝)𝛽
1 − 𝜉𝑝𝛽
𝜋𝑡−1] (18) 
In equation the above equations, we assumed that the current interest rate is 
observed by boundedly rational agents, while current output and inflation are 
not.  
Independently of the fraction and the kind of boundedly rational agents, to 
perform welfare analysis under model uncertainty, we need a second-order 
approximation of the utility function (5). The instantaneous loss can be written 
as follows: 
 𝐿𝑡 =
1
2
[(𝛾 +
1
𝜎
) 𝑦𝑡
2 + (𝜂2𝛾)𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑡(𝑖)) +
1
𝜎
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖(𝑐𝑡(𝑖))] (19) 
Due to the agents’ heterogeneity, the welfare criterion (19) is made up of three 
components. Beyond the traditional costs related to consumption variability and 
price dispersion, there is an additional cost which captures the inequality in the 
consumption of the different types of agents 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖(𝑐𝑡(𝑖)). Everything equal, the 
cost reaches the maximum in case population is split in half which happens when 
𝛼 = 0.5 . The cross-sectional variability of expectations, which involves 
differences in consumption and labour/leisure choices, implies higher inequality. 
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Different assumptions about the forecasting horizon combined with agent 
heterogeneity lead to different dynamics for the price dispersion. Assuming 
S(SFs) and L(HFs), price dispersion can be written as:
6
 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝𝑡(𝑖))𝑖
𝑆
= [𝜋𝑡
2 +
𝜉𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝛽𝜃
2𝜋𝑡−1 −
𝜉𝑝
2(1 − 𝛼)𝑘
𝛼(1 − 𝜉𝑝)
(𝑐𝑡))
2
] (20) 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝𝑡(𝑖))𝑖
𝐿
= [𝜋𝑡
2 +
𝜉𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝛽𝜋𝑡−1 −
𝜉𝑝
2(1 − 𝛼)𝑘
𝛼(1 − 𝜉𝑝)
(𝑐𝑡))
2
] (21) 
In both cases, consumption dispersion across agents is: 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖(𝑐𝑡(𝑖)) =
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
(
1
𝜎
∑(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1)
∞
𝑡=0
− 𝑐𝑡)
2
 (22) 
4 Robust optimal policies 
4.1 Calibration 
We calibrate the models to the U.S. economy. The time unit is one quarter. 
Structural parameters are taken from Woodford (2003), who used structural 
vector auto-regression (SVAR) methodology and microeconomic evidence. We 
assume that the subjective discount rate  𝛽 is 0.99 to match the observed U.S. 
long-run average real interest rate. In the goods market, the elasticity of 
substitution between the differentiated goods is set at7.84, implying a markup of 
15percent. The frequency of price adjustment (𝜉𝑝) is 0.66, implying that prices 
are fixed for three quarters on average. Finally, the inverse of Frisch labor 
supply elasticity (𝛾) is 0.47 from microdata regarding labor costs.7Our calibration 
is summarized in Table 1.8 
 
 
Table 1 – Baseline calibration 
𝛽 = 0.99 𝜎 = 0.16 𝜂 = 7.84 𝛾 = 0.47 𝜉𝑝 = 0.66 
 
 
Regarding bounded rationality, we consider a wide realistic range of share of 
rational agents (from 50 to 100 percent). It is worth mentioning that Bayesian 
estimations of a full DSGE behavioral model lead to values for  ranging 0.4 and 
0.7 and  between 0.6 and 0.9 in the model with SSFs;  varies between 0.8 
and 0.9 when LHFs are assumed (see Beqiraj et al., 2018). Looking at 
expectation surveys, estimations based on Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2015) 
                                           
6 The different dynamics are derived in Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) and Beqiraj et al. (2017). 
7 See Woodford (2003) for details. 
8 Branch and McGough (2009) and Massaro (2013) used similar calibration. 
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methodology lead to similar values.9 
4.2 How many are boundedly rational agents? 
We assume that monetary authorities ignore how many boundedly rational 
agents are present in the economy but know how they form expectations (so the 
shape of the welfare function is also known). The central banker can make two 
kinds of mistakes: overestimate or underestimate the fraction of rational agents. 
We investigate which error is less costly in terms of welfare. Formally, we 
explore the optimal robust policies. 
Our results are illustrated in the following sections. Section 4.2.1 refers to 
commitment and Section 4.2.2 refers to discretion. In each section, assuming 
either SSFs or LHFs, a table reports the welfare obtained when the central bank 
believes that the share of rational agents is 𝛼𝐶𝐵 , but the true share is 𝛼𝑅 . 
According to the terminology introduced in Section 2, different 𝛼𝐶𝐵  indicates 
different policy rules, whereas different 𝛼𝑅  represents potentially different 
models of the economy. 
The reported losses are normalized for the optimal loss obtained in the standard 
case of rational expectations, i.e., when 𝛼𝑅 = 𝛼𝐶𝐵 = 1. The values of the principal 
diagonals are the cases when the central bank correctly understands the share 
of rational agents (i.e., no mistake). Instead, off diagonal values overestimate 
(upper diagonal elements) or underestimate (lower diagonal elements) this 
share. Finally, the last two columns report the maximum regret obtained by 
implementing a monetary rule when 𝛼 = 𝛼𝐶𝐵  is assumed. By an asterisk, we 
emphasize the minimum among the maximum regrets, which indicates the 
optimal robust policy. By a double asterisk, we indicate instead the minimax 
solution.  
4.2.1 Commitment 
Let us look at the case of commitment with SSFs described by Table 2(a).All the 
values in the table are greater than one; therefore, the existence of cognitive 
limitation always implies some welfare costs (at least on aggregate)when 
compared to the case where all the agents are rational. Moreover, it is easy to 
verify that the aggregate costs associated with bounded rationality increase in 
the share of non-rational agents. 
Regarding model uncertainty, the table shows that making a mistake always 
involves welfare costs. In fact, the diagonal terms always are the greatest values 
of the columns. For instance, assuming the true fraction of rational is 70% 
(𝛼𝑅 = 0.7), the welfare loss associated to the correct perception of this fraction is 
6.53 (diagonal value, 𝛼𝐶𝐵 = 𝛼𝑅). If the central bank overestimates it (perceiving, 
e.g.,𝛼 = 0.8), welfare is 6.63 (which implies a higher cost of 1,2% compared to 
𝛼𝐶𝐵 = 𝛼𝑅). Similarly, when it underestimates the share (e.g., 𝛼 = 0.6), welfare 
becomes 6.61 (which also implies a higher cost of1.2%). 
According to the minimax regret criterion, the robust optimal policy is obtained 
when the central bank behaves as if there were only rational agents. The 
maximum regret associated to this policy is the lowest (2.12). This occurs 
because welfare losses incredibly increase in case the central bank strongly 
                                           
9 See Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) and Beqiraj et al. (2017). 
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believes the economy is populated by non-rational agents, but there are instead 
only rational agents.10 
 
Table 2(a) - Welfare losses under commitment with SSFs 
Perceived True proportion (𝛼𝑅)   
(𝛼𝐶𝐵) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Max 
Min 
Max  
Regret 
0.5 10.21     8.17     6.97     6.36     5.75     4.31    10.21** 3.31 
0.6  10.34    8.08     6.61     5.71     5.09     3.88    10.34 2.88 
0.7  10.61     8.19     6.53     5.40     4.67     3.63    10.61 2.63 
0.8  11.01     8.45     6.63    5.32     4.41     3.49    11.01 2.49 
0.9  11.57     8.91     6.95     5.46    4.32     3.42    11.57 2.42 
1.0  12.33     9.68     7.69     6.11     4.74    1.00    12.33 2.12* 
 
Assuming that agents are LHFs, commitment is described in Table 2(b). The 
outcomes are like those described for SSFs’ case. The minimum among the 
maximum regret is obtained for the policy rule associated to the model where 
𝛼𝐶𝐵 = 1.0. In this case, the maximum regret is 2.06.  
 
Table 2(b) - Welfare losses under commitment with LHFs 
Perceived True proportion (𝛼𝑅)   
(𝛼𝐶𝐵) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Max  
Min 
Max 
Regret 
0.5 20.04 13.12 8.69 6.56 6.43 18.54 20.04** 17.54 
0.6 20.11 13.05 8.41 5.89 5.08 9.64 20.11 8.64 
0.7 20.30 13.10 8.34 5.65 4.40 5.57 20.30 4.57 
0.8 20.59 13.23 8.37 5.59 4.07 3.78 20.59 2.78 
0.9 20.77 13.31 8.48 5.68 3.98 3.08 20.77 2.08 
1.0 21.83 15.11 9.75 6.08 4.04 1.00 21.83 2.06* 
 
However, if the central bank takes its action based on the minimax criterion, the 
scenario will change radically. In both cases, it in fact implies that the central 
bank should behave as the amount of boundedly rational agents in the economy 
is the highest irrespectively of its true share. The intuition is quite simple. As 
long as the share of rational agents falls, the welfare loss increases.11 Then, 
when the share of boundedly rational agents is high, optimal policy requires 
internalizing this information accounting exactly for them. As above explained, 
the two criteria can give misleading results.  
                                           
10 Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) focused upon a dichotomous scenario where  
the share of rational agents can only assume two given values (1 or 0.7). They found that, 
according to the minimax regret criterion, the optimal robust policy requires taking into account 
30% of boundedly rational agents in both policy regimes. 
11 Note that the highest loss for each policy correspond to those reported in columns (1), where 
the share of rational agents is the lowest. 
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4.2.2 Discretion 
Let us now investigate the effects of cognitive limitation when the central bank 
operates in a discretionary fashion. Results are illustrated in Table 3(a) and 3(b), 
which refer to the cases of SSFs and LHFs. 
 
Table 3(a) - Welfare losses under discretion with SSFs 
Perceived True proportion (𝛼𝑅)   
(𝛼𝐶𝐵) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Max 
Min 
Max  
Regret 
0.5 8.15 6.48 5.26 4.31 3.67 3.31 8.15** 2.31 
0.6 8.19 6.49 5.27 4.33 3.63 3.24 8.19 2.24 
0.7 8.31 6.53 5.28 4.35 3.63 3.19 8.31 2.19 
0.8 8.52 6.64 5.32 4.37 3.64 3.17 8.52 2.17 
0.9 8.85 6.88 5.46 4.41 3.65 3.15 8.85 2.15 
1.0 9.32 7.32 5.84 4.68 3.73 1.00 9.32 1.17* 
 
Table 3(b) - Welfare losses under discretion with LHFs 
Perceived True proportion (𝛼𝑅)   
(𝛼𝐶𝐵) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Max 
Min 
Max 
Regret 
0.5 16.79 11.69 8.14 7.68 29.70 344.26 16.79** 343.25 
0.6 16.79 11.62 8.03 7.13 56.84 263.13 16.79 262.13 
0.7 16.92 11.61 7.91 6.55 26.97 119.09 16.92 118.09 
0.8 17.10 11.56 7.71 6.01 13.49 54.01 17.10 53.01 
0.9 17.03 11.32 7.50 5.68 16.20 22.23 17.03 21.23 
1.0 16.85 13.08 13.24 9.87 5.44 1.00 16.85 5.73* 
 
Again, all values in the tables are greater than one, indicating welfare costs 
compared to the case when all the agents are rational. The aggregate costs 
associated with bounded rationality increase in the share of non-rational agents.  
Now, differently from the commitment regime, lowest losses implied by 
discretionary rules are no longer distributed along the main diagonal. Therefore, 
even if the central banker would be perfectly informed about the share of 
rational agents (i.e., the true 𝛼𝑅 ), it would somehow find to ignore this 
information, choosing a rule corresponding to 𝛼𝐶𝐵 < 𝛼𝑅 (it is easy to verify that 
underestimation improves central bank’s performance).12 
The rationale of the above result is as follows. In the textbook model, the 
discretionary planner may improve its policy efficacy by responding to inflation 
more aggressively than required by the society through a commitment to a 
weight against inflation losses greater than that the society would commit to. 
We can refer to this case as optimal delegation.  
The government appoints a central bank or delegates to the central bank an 
objective function that differs from the social welfare function derived 
                                           
12 For example, if there are 90% of rational agents, it could be convenient for the central bank to 
ignore this information. Underestimating it, e.g., implementing the policy rule consistent with𝛼𝐶𝐵 =
0.5, the loss is 3.67, which is lower than the loss obtained when the policy consistent with the true 
model is chosen (3.63). 
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considering social beliefs and preferences. The delegation however improves the 
society (government’s) welfare measure. By committing to a more aggressive 
behavior to inflation, if in the economy there is some inertia, the central bank 
can stabilize the expectation reducing the cost of stabilizing the current trade-off 
between inflation and output (Clarida et al., 1999).  
In our framework, inertia is intrinsic to boundedly rational agents’ behavior and 
discretionary rules associated to smaller share of rational agents might put more 
pressure on inflation stabilization. Then the rationale is as above. An inefficient 
deviation from the welfare-consistent rule, due to the underestimation of 
rational agents, leads to a more aggressive policy towards inflation. In turn, 
aggressiveness stabilizes rational agents’ expectations and improves the current 
trade-off between inflation variability and output gap.  
Regarding robust optimal policies, as in the case of commitment, the maximum 
regret is always minimized implementing a policy which ignores that all agents 
might be not rational. When agents are SSFs (cf. Table 3(a)), the optimal regret 
is 1.17, which is the lowest value of the last column of Table 3(a). Similarly, 
when they are LHFs (cf. Table 3(b)), the minimax regret value is 5.73. Both are 
consistent with a policy that assumes =1.   
As a result, based on Savage’s criterion, when the central bank knows how 
expectations are formed but ignores the share of boundedly rational agents, 
robust policy design under discretion (and commitment) requires that the central 
banker should implement a policy consistent with the assumption that the 
economy is as if all the agents are fully rational, ignoring the fraction of 
boundedly rational agents. 
When the minimax criteria are considered, instead of minimizing the maximum 
regret, the picture is mixed and the optimal policy solution should consider 
highest bounded rationality in the economy. The minimax regret criterion takes 
into account that certain realizations of the unknown state of nature (our correct 
model) are associated with relatively high losses regardless of the policy choice. 
Whereas the minimax criterion has been criticized in the sense that it is not 
required to obey to the axiom of independence or irrelevant alternatives 
provided by Chernoff (1954), while decision making under it. The axiom, is 
frequently used in the individual choice theory and states that if an alternative 𝑥 
is chosen from a set 𝑇, and 𝑥 is also an element of a subset 𝑆 ∈ 𝑇 , then 𝑥 must 
be chosen from 𝑆. That is, context in which alternatives are made should not 
affect the selection of 𝑥 as the best option.13 
4.3 Who is the boundedly rational agent? 
In this section, we consider that the central bank knows the share of boundedly 
rational agents (𝛼𝑅 = 𝛼𝐶𝐵) but ignores how expectations are formed. Specifically, 
we assume that the central bank observes the correct economic structure 
(constraints), but it can maximize the wrong welfare function. This occurs when 
the central banker misunderstands the kind of boundedly rational agents and 
adopts the wrong welfare criterion to design monetary policy.  
                                           
13 Blume et al. (2006) assume that such an axiomatization of rationality can be interpreted in a 
restrictive sense meaning that agents have preferences which obey certain conditions only over 
states under consideration and not over all possible states of the world, as supposed by Savage. 
 16 
 
Results are illustrated in Tables 4(a) (commitment) and 4(b) (discretion). In 
each case, we have two possible models and two possible policies. We indicate 
by "true" the true model and by "perceived" the model adopted by the central 
bank to select the welfare criterion. We consider model uncertainty for a large 
range of observed shares of rational agents.14 For each share, robust policy is 
derived comparing welfare outcomes from a 4 by 4 matrix derived by 
considering the two possible models and the two possible policies (obtained by 
using one of the two different welfare criteria). Regrets are reported in the last 
columns and the robust policy is indicated by an asterisk. 
Let us discuss the results when the commitment regime is implemented (cf. 
Table 4(a)). Bold numbers are welfare losses obtained when there is no 
uncertainty, i.e., the monetary authority is able to minimize the welfare loss 
consistent with the kind of boundedly rational agents. Welfare losses are 
decreasing in the share of rational agents in both frameworks (SSFs and LHFs). 
Moreover, misunderstanding the true model always implies additional costs 
(compare welfare outcomes by row).
15
 
Regarding model uncertainty, as said, robust policies are derived by comparing 
regrets associated with the two different rules in the two alternative 
specifications of the economy. The robust policy is chosen by applying Savage’s 
criterion. For any given share of rational agents, monetary policy should be 
designed assuming that agents always are SSFs. 
 
 
Table 4(a) - Welfare losses with uncertainty about expectation formation process: commitment 
  Perceived Max Max 
True 𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹 Min Regret 
0.5 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  20.04     22.71    29.34 19.13 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  29.34     10.21    22.71** 2.67* 
0.6 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  13.05     15.97    23.25 15.17 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  23.25     8.08    15.97** 2.92* 
0.7 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  8.34     10.88    18.03 11.50 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  18.03     6.53    10.88** 2.54* 
0.8 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  5.59     7.61    13.42 8.10 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  13.42     5.32    7.61** 2.02* 
0.9 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  3.98     5.71    9.27 4.95 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  9.27     4.32    5.71** 1.73* 
 
Table 4(b) replicates previous analysis in case the central bank acts under 
discretion. The results reported are confirmed and the central bank robust policy 
requires assuming that all the agents are SSFs with the exception of the 
extreme case where the share of rational agents is 90%. The minimax criterion 
leads to similar results in both policy regimes. 
                                           
14 The full rationality 𝛼𝑅 = 1.0 is not illustrated because the two forecasts mechanisms collapse to 
the standard rational expectations case and get same welfare losses. 
15 For example, when the central bank knows that the share of boundedly rational agents is 20%, 
but the central banker wrongly believes that they are LHFs, the welfare loss is 13.42. By contrast, 
if the central bank correctly understands that agents are SSFs, welfare loss decreases to 5.32. 
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Table 4(b) - Welfare losses with uncertainty about expectation formation process: discretion 
  Perceived Max Max 
True 𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹 Min Regret 
0.5 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  13.11     17.80    20.91 14.76 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  22.91     8.15    15.51** 4.69* 
0.6 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  8.99     13.80    17.47 11.80 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  18.29     6.49    12.40** 4.81* 
0.7 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  6.03     10.43    14.15 9.03 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  14.31     5.28    9.99** 4.40* 
0.8 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  4.34     8.21    10.91 6.38 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  10.75     4.37    8.06** 3.87* 
0.9 
𝛼𝐿𝐻𝐹  3.86     7.79    7.74 3.87* 
𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐹  7.52     3.65    6.39** 3.93 
 
4.4 Bi-dimensional uncertainty 
Central bankers might ignore both the share and how boundedly rational agents 
form their expectations. In this section, we intersect the previous two by 
considering the cost of misunderstanding the shape of the welfare-based loss 
rule (ignoring if agents are SSFs or LHFs) and the cost of ignoring the share of 
rational agents into the economy. In other words, uncertainty is bi-dimensional: 
uncertainty about the share of rational agents () and uncertainty about the way 
expectations are formed (SSF/LHF).  
Combining the uncertainty about the share of rational agents (5 cases) and that 
regarding the way expectations are formed (2 cases), we obtain 10 possible 
states of the world. The central banker observes the economic dynamics and 
implements monetary policy by choosing the welfare loss to minimize. As the 
loss depends on both the share of rational agents and the way expectations are 
formed, ten policy options are also available (one for each perceived state of the 
world). Combining state of the worlds and perceived state of the world we can 
represent all possible losses in a ten-by-ten table, and derive robust optimal 
policies. Again, we distinguish the case of commitment and discretion. 
The losses obtained for each policy option in each possible state of the world are 
reported in Table 5(a). In the table is always assumed that the central bank can 
commit to a policy rule, minimizing the loss corresponding to the perceived 
model constrained by the true model of the economy. Therefore, off diagonal 
terms represent misunderstanding of the economy by the central banker.  
Looking at the table as a 4 blocks matrix (each block is a 10-by-10 matrix), the 
top-left and bottom-right blocks are clearly derived from Table 2(a) and 2(b) 
from Section 4.2.1. In such a case, the central banker understands the way 
expectations are formed, but he can eventually over or under estimate the share 
of rational agents. The bottom-left and top-right blocks report the losses 
obtained when the central banker also misunderstands the way expectations are 
formed: he believes that agents are SSF when they are LHFs and vice versa. It 
reports the costs of double errors.  
Central bankers’ misunderstandings are costlier when model uncertainty is 
related to two dimensions. For instance, assume that agents are SSFs and the 
share of rational is 60%, if the central bank wrongly supposes that they are 50% 
but understands how expectations are formed, the loss is 8.2. But if the central 
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bank also misunderstands the expectation formation mechanism supposing that 
agents are LHFs, the loss becomes 25.4. The result is always confirmed if the 
economy is populated by SSFs. By comparing top and bottom block matrices it 
can be checked that if agents are LHFs and the fraction of agents is close to one, 
central banker’s double uncertainties are instead less costly than single errors. 
Robust optimal policies imply that the central bank should minimize the standard 
welfare loss, i.e., ignoring the existence of agents with limited rationality. It is 
worth mentioning that formally according to our previous results the central 
banker should assume that agents are SSFs; however, this is irrelevant since 
when he also supposes that all the agents are rational, the loss is independent of 
the way expectations are formed. The same result is obtained when alternative 
criteria are considered. 
 
Table 5(a) - Welfare losses under commitment with double uncertainty  
True model          
Perceived 
model 
SSF 
[0.5 
 
0.6 
 
0.7 
 
0.8 
 
0.9 
 
1.0] 
LHF 
[0.5 
 
0.6 
 
0.7 
 
0.8 
 
0.9 
 
1.0] 
Max 
Min 
Max 
Regret 
SSF [0.5 10.2 8.2 7.0 6.4 5.8 4.3 22.9 20.0 17.0 13.7 10.0 6.2 22.91 12.4 
0.6 10.3 8.1 6.6 5.7 5.1 3.9 21.0 18.3 15.6 12.6 9.3 5.9 20.95 10.5 
0.7 10.6 8.2 6.5 5.4 4.7 3.6 19.2 16.7 14.3 11.6 8.6 5.6 19.16 8.7 
0.8 11.0 8.5 6.6 5.3 4.4 3.5 17.3 15.2 13.1 10.8 8.1 5.3 17.33 6.9 
0.9 11.6 8.9 7.0 5.5 4.3 3.4 15.0 13.2 11.6 9.8 7.5 5.1 14.95 4.5 
1.0] 12.3 9.7 7.7 6.1 4.7 1.0 10.5 8.7 7.6 7.0 6.5 1.0 12.33 2.5 
LHF [0.5 29.3 25.4 21.3 16.9 12.0 7.1 20.0 13.1 8.7 6.6 6.4 18.5 29.34 19.1 
0.6 26.9 23.3 19.6 15.6 11.2 6.8 20.1 13.1 8.4 5.9 5.1 9.6 26.88 16.7 
0.7 24.6 21.3 18.0 14.5 10.5 6.5 20.3 13.1 8.3 5.7 4.4 5.6 24.62 14.4 
0.8 22.3 19.4 16.5 13.4 9.9 6.3 20.6 13.2 8.4 5.6 4.1 3.8 22.29 12.1 
0.9 19.2 16.8 14.7 12.3 9.3 6.0 20.8 13.3 8.5 5.7 4.0 3.1 20.77 10.3 
1.0] 13.6 11.1 9.5 8.6 7.9 1.0 21.8 15.1 9.8 6.1 4.0 1.0 21.83 11.4 
 
A similar table is built for discretion: Table 5(b). Also under discretion and if 
agents are LHFs, it is not always true that central banker’s double errors are 
costlier than single errors. When the fraction of rational agents is close to one, 
implementing policy assuming SSFs dominates policies based on LHFs, even if 
agents are LHFs. Robust optimal policies imply that the central bank should 
minimize its loss by assuming that agents are SSFs and the share of rational is 
between 0.6 and 0.8 (depending on the criteria used to derive them).  
 
Table 5(b) - Welfare losses under discretion with double uncertainty  
True model          
Perceived 
model 
SSF 
[0.5 
 
0.6 
 
0.7 
 
0.8 
 
0.9 
 
1.0] 
LHF 
[0.5 
 
0.6 
 
0.7 
 
0.8 
 
0.9 
 
1.0] 
Max 
Min 
Max 
Regret 
SSF [0.5 8.2 6.5 5.3 4.3 3.7 3.3 17.8 13.5 9.8 20.3 7.6 8.5 20.3 15.2 
0.6 8.2 6.5 5.3 4.3 3.6 3.2 17.6 13.8 10.3 7.7 9.5 6.9 17.6 5.9 
0.7 8.3 6.5 5.3 4.4 3.6 3.2 17.8 14.7 10.4 5.1 10.1 6.3 17.8 5.3 
0.8 8.5 6.6 5.3 4.4 3.6 3.2 18.5 16.2 10.7 8.2 8.2 6.1 18.5 5.1 
0.9 8.9 6.9 5.5 4.4 3.7 3.2 19.9 18.6 11.0 7.5 7.8 6.3 19.9 7.3 
1.0] 9.3 7.3 5.8 4.7 3.7 1.0 25.7 21.7 14.0 11.7 7.6 1.0 25.7 10.4 
LHF [0.5 22.7 15.7 10.5 7.4 5.9 10.7 16.8 11.7 8.1 7.7 29.7 344 344 343 
0.6 22.5 16.0 10.6 7.5 5.8 7.3 16.8 11.6 8.0 7.1 56.8 263 263 262 
0.7 23.0 16.7 10.9 7.6 5.7 5.7 16.9 11.6 7.9 6.6 27.0 119 119 118 
0.8 24.0 17.9 11.2 7.6 5.7 4.9 17.1 11.6 7.7 6.0 13.5 54.0 54.0 53.0 
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0.9 26.3 20.2 11.5 7.7 5.7 4.6 17.0 11.3 7.5 5.7 16.2 22.2 26.3 21.2 
1.0] 33.8 27.7 11.8 7.7 5.7 1.0 16.9 13.1 13.2 9.9 5.4 1.0 33.8 25.7 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper investigated monetary policy optimal design under model uncertainty. 
It used non-Bayesian robust control techniques. We considered a sticky price 
DSGE economy and assumed that some agents behave according to some 
limited rationality when they have to form their expectations about the future. 
Moreover, we also assumed that agents can be either short-sighted (SSFs) or 
long-horizon forecasters (LHFs). The former behave according to their Euler 
equations, so, period-by-period, they need to forecast future one period ahead. 
Instead, the latter behave according to their inter-temporal constraints, so they 
have to forecast the long-run expected values (e.g., their expected permanent 
income for the consumers). 16  The central bank then might face model 
uncertainty ignoring the share of boundedly rational agents and/or how their 
expectations are formed (i.e., agents are SSFs or LHFs). 
We began by focusing upon uncertainty about the true distribution of agents. 
The central bank knows how expectations are formed (and then the shape of the 
welfare loss) but ignores the share of rational agents populating the economy. 
Second, we investigate robust policies when the central banker knows the 
fraction of boundedly rational agents but ignores whether the economy is 
populated by SSFs or LHFs. Finally, the two previous forms of model uncertainty 
are simultaneously considered. We introduced a bi-dimensional model 
uncertainty, assuming that the central banker ignores both the share and the 
forecasting mechanism of boundedly rational agents. In all the cases, we 
calculated robust policies for a wide range of the share of rational agents in the 
economy, varying from 50 to 100 percent. Both commitment and discretion 
were considered.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. 
When model uncertainty only belongs to the true fraction of boundedly rational 
agents, minimax and minimax regret criterion lead to opposite policy 
implications. The latter is associated to robust policies designed by ignoring the 
existence of boundedly rational agents in the economy. According to the former, 
instead, the robust policy requires considering the highest degree of bounded 
rationality. The result holds for both commitment and discretion. 
When model uncertainty only belongs to the mechanism boundedly rational 
agents use to form their expectations, the central bank knows the share of 
rational agents but two kinds of mistakes can be made: assuming LHFs in a 
world where all the agents are SSFs or neglecting them in a context where 
agents truly are long-sighted. We find that the policymaker should always 
conduct monetary policy by assuming that agents are SSFs. The result is 
confirmed by using both non-Bayesian robust control techniques. 
Combining the above cases, we also explore the case where bi-dimensional 
model uncertainty is introduced: a central banker who ignores both the share of 
boundedly rational agents and their forecasts horizon. Additional welfare losses 
                                           
16 If all the agents are rational, the assumption about the forecasting horizon does not matter. 
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due to double model uncertainty decrease as the number of rational forecasters 
increases in the economy. Our analysis suggested that the ability of the central 
bank to recognize only the forecasts mechanism of non-rational agents, while 
still misunderstanding their share, would not always minimize welfare losses. If 
the economy is populated by LHFs, it is not always true that central banker’s 
double errors are costlier than single errors. However, double uncertainty 
confirms the robust policy obtained in the case of commitment. By contrast, 
under discretion, robust optimal policies are implemented considering that the 
share of rational agents is between 60% and 80%.  
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